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A first encounter with the phrase "collapsible corporation" is likely
to summon up disagreeable remembrances of things past. Fortunate is
he who has never been associated with a corporation which has col-
lapsed. And yet a notion of the meaning of the phrase based on past un-
pleasant experience is quite anachronistic. In recent years, corporations
now Congressionally defined as collapsible1 have been the means for
the most fundamental financial pleasure, the realization of substantial
income at capital gains rates.
2
When individual income tax rates have ranged as high as 91 per-
cent,3 the inducement to the taxpayer to couple imagination with logic
in attacking his tax problems has been very great. The desire to con-
vert ordinary income to long-term capital gain, taxable at a maximum
effective rate of 25 percent,4 has been overpowering. These considera-
tions formed the rootstock for the collapsible corporation, one of the
fragile blossoms in the recent crop of tax-saving devices. If the device
was fragile in the past, its future has been rendered even more tenuous
by the Revenue Act of 195o.
1Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 212 (1950); Int. Rev. Code § 117 (m), as
amended Sept. 23, 1950.
2The Bureau of Internal Revenue does not agree, contending, but without great
assurance, that the collapsible did not accomplish its supposed tax saving even under
the law as it stood prior to the recent amendment. Hearings before Committee on
Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950, Sist Cong. ad Sess. (1950) 141; see
statement of Secretary of the Treasury Snyder at page 152 infra.
3This is the combined normal and maximum surtax rate. In recent years the
maximum effective combined rate has been something less than 91 per cent because
of the tax reduction provided by Int. Rev. Code § ia(c), which reduction is eliminated
for the year 1951. Pub. L. No. 814, 2d Sess., § 1oi (195o). Furthermore, the com-
bined normal tax and surtax has not been permitted to exceed 77 per cent, 8o per
cent, or, for 1951, 87 per cent of net income. See Int. Rev. Code §§ 12(c)(2) and 12(f).
'The alternative long-term capital gains tax provided by Sec. ii7(c) permits
an individual to pay a tax of 5o per cent on 50 per cent of his gain in lieu of other
income tax, if that is to his advantage; this, of course equals a tax of 25 per cent
of the entire amount of the gain.
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Why the Collapsible Was Used
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code5 contains the definition
of gross income for federal income tax purposes and expressly includes
"gains... derived from.. . sales, or dealings in property." Section 111,
with appropriate reference to Section 113 (b), indicates the manner in
which the amount of gain from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty is to be determined.6 Section 23 authorizes certain deductions from
gross income to arrive at net income upon which the tax is imposed.
If the matter rested there, no tax advantages would arise from the
use of the collapsible device. That is, if all income were taxed alike,
the manner in which it was acquired would be of no consequence. But
provision is made for special tax treatment of some gains from the
sale or exchange of property. In the case of an individual, if the gain
is from the sale or exchange of a capital asset7 as defined in Section
117(a)(i)8 and if such asset has been held for more than six months,
only 50 percent of the gain need be taken into account for tax pur-
poses.9 Furthermore, an alternative taxing method is provided'0 under
which, instead of the gain taken into account being taxed at the regu-
lar graduated surtax rates, such gain is taxed at a rate of 50 percent
when this alternative favors the taxpayer." The maximum tax rate of
50 percent applied to 50 percent of the gain results in a maximum
effective tax of 25 percent on long-term capital gains, which otherwise
might be subject to much higher combined normal and surtax rates.
There is reason to believe that the collapsible device has been
5Unless otherwise stated, all section references in the text of this article are to
sections of the Internal Reveue Code.
GInt. Rev. Code § s 11 also deals with the question of recognition of gain and
loss and in this connection makes reference to Sec. 112. The non-recognition pro-
visions of the Code are not of importance at this point, but Sec. s12(b)(x), (5), (7)
transactions are discussed infra at pages 159 and 166 respectively.
7Whether capital gains should be taxed, and, if so, how, are problems not fully
settled, even apart from the question of abuse of the present capital gains pro-
visions. See, e.g., Griswold, Cases and Materials on Feredal Taxation (3d ed. 1950)
403-405; Blum. The Decline and Fall of Capital Gains: 1921-1957, 28 Taxes (1950),
digested in Monthly Digest of Tax Articles, Nov. 195o, p. 63 ,8See also Int. Rev. Code § 117(J), which provides for similar treatment of gain
from the sale or exchange of certain property not included within the definition
of capital assets.
"Int. Rev. Code § 117(b).101nt. Rev. Code § 117(c).
"The alternative method can favor the taxpayer only if his income without re-
gard to capital gains, or together with his capital gains, is so large that the top in-
crement will be subjected to rates in excess of 50 per cent.
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widely used in the building and motion picture industries.' 2 The na-
ture of the device may perhaps best be explained by three oversimpli-
fied 13 examples based upon the building industry.
14
i. Jones and Smith acquire Black Acres for $so,ooo, construct
thereon twenty low-cost houses for an added cost of $9o,ooo, and
then sell the houses and lots for an aggregate of $i5o,ooo.
Conceding that Jones and Smith should not be too unhappy about
the venture, much of their enjoyment will evaporate as they watch
a substantial portion of their $5o,ooo gain melt away in the form of
taxes. The houses sold by Jones and Smith, being held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, would not be
within the code definition of capital assets,15 and the gain on the sale
of the houses would not qualify for special tax treatment as long-term
captial gain, but instead would be treated as ordinary income.
2. Jones and Smith form Construction Corporation, to which
they contribute a total of $1oo,ooo for all the stock except quali-
fying shares. Construction Corporation acquires Black Acres
for $1o,ooo, constructs thereon twenty low-cost houses for an
added cost of $9o,ooo, and then sells the houses and lots for an
aggregate of $15o,ooo.
In this example, the corporation's gain on the sale of the houses
is ordinary income for the same reason that the gain of Jones and
"See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 45. If it has not been
used in several other industries, it is surprising. As the example in the text sug-
gests, the device is most adaptable to major-project businesses, i.e., the production of
a motion picture, the construction of residential or commercial buildings, etc. But
consider production of a wheat or other crop by a corporate farm or the year's
output of a winery or cannery.
'TFor a somewhat more realistic example see Hearings before Committee on
Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of i95o, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 140. "Mr.
Jenkins ... Suppose there is a real estate man, a plasterer and a lumberman and an
electrician, a plumber and two or three more, say ten, who engaged in some con-
struction work. Suppose they go to work and build a big addition. They buy the
land cheap and they do the work economically and well. In other words, it is a
money-making proposition. The ten of them build ioo houses. If it is so simple
as this, after they have done the work can they dissolve and apportion those houses
out ten to each one?" Doubt was expressed that the scheme would be even that ob-
vious. Yet, as is suggested infra, page x62, this may be an example of a collapsible
invulnerable under the new provison.
'For an excellent pre-amendment discussion of the collapsible device as used in
the motion picture industry see Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and
the Income Tax (195o) 5 Tax L. Rev. 437. As the title suggests, the authors ap-
propriately treat the collapsible problem as just one aspect of the broader problem
of the taxation of corporate liquidation. This article, however, is limited to col-
lapsibles.
'Int. Rev. Code § 117(a)(i)(A).
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Smith was ordinary income in the first example.' 6 The corporation
will be taxed on the $50,000 gain at regular corporate rates. If it con-
tinues in business and distributes earnings to Jones and Smith, they
will have ordinary income in the amount of their dividends.' 7 If, in-
stead, the corporation is dissolved and the assets are distributed to
Jones and Smith, they will have capital gain' 8 subject to special tax
treatment, but the corporate tax will have taken a big bite out of their
gain.
3. Jones and Smith form Construction Corporation, to which
they contribute a total of $ioo,ooo for all the stock except quali-
fying shares. Construction Corporation acquires Black Acres
for $io,ooo and constructs thereon twenty low-cost houses for an
added cost of $90,0o0. The aggregate fair market value of the
houses and lots is $15o,ooo, but the Corporation does not sell
them. It is collapsed, that is, dissolved, and the houses and lots
are distributed to Jones and Smith, who then sell them for an
aggregate of $15o,ooo.19
Jones and Smith lick their chops. Disregarding for the moment the
recent statutory changes, the distribution to them upon dissolution
is treated as payment in exchange for their stock,20 and the stock is
within the Code definition of capital assets. 2' Assuming they have
held their stock for more than six months, Jones and Smith have long-
"Int. Rev. Code § 117(a)(1)(A).
"Int. Rev. Code § 115(a) defines "dividend" to include any distribution by a
corporation out of earnings and profits accumulated after Feb. 28, 1913, or out of
earnings and profits of the taxable year, with certain exceptions not relevant here.
"Int. Rev. Code § 115(c): "Amount distributed in complete liquidation of a
corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock...." White
v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 59 S. Ct. 179, 83 L. ed. 172 (1938); Helvering v. Chester
L. Weaver Co., 305 U. S. 293, 59 S. Ct. 185, 83 L. ed. 18o (1938). Int. Rev. Code
§ 115(g), which in effect taxes certain corporate distributions "essentially equivalent
to the distribution of a taxable dividend" as ordinary income, is inapplicable here.
U. S. Treas. Reg. i11, § 29.115-9.
"9There is, of course, some possibility that a sale by shareholders of property
recently distributed to them by a corporation will be treated as a sale by the cor-
poration. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 537, 90 L. ed.
677 (1945). But if the corporation has not negotiated the sale this result will not
follow. United States v. Cumberland Public Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S. Ct. 280,
94 L. ed. 237 (195o). Apparently the Commissioner will not attempt to use the Court
Holding Company doctrine in attacking preamendment collapsibles; instead of
treating the ultimate sale as made by the corporation, the plan of attack seems
to be to disregard the corporate entity as a mere sham. See Hearings before Com-
mittee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 138.
"See note 18 Supra.
"Int. Rev. Code § 117(a). It is possible, of course, to contend that the stock
itself is held primarily for sale to customers and therefore removed from the defi-
nition of capital assets by Sec. 117(a)(i)(A).
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term capital gain, upon dissolution, and the corporation has realized
no income.22 Jones and Smith get a stepped-up basis for the property,23
$15o,ooo, and therefore they have no gain upon its subsequent sale at
that price.
Again disregarding for the moment the recent statutory changes,
two variations of the collapsible device may have been possible. In the
third example, Jones and Smith may simply sell their stock after con-
struction of the houses, in which case their gain on the sale of the
stock may be treated as capital gain. But in this variation there is a
greater possibility that the stock will be considered as held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and therefore
not a capital asset within the Code definition. 24 If this were true, the
gain would be ordinary income and the device would have failed.
The other possible variation is a distribution in kind without dis-
solution and prior to realization by the corporation of any gain. Under
Section 115 a distribution by a corporation to its shareholders is a
dividend only if made either (i) out of earnings or profits accumulated
after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of earnings or profits of the taxable
year. Thus, if the corporation has no earnings or profits, and the col-
lapsible would have none, a distribution will not be treated as a divi-
dend. Instead, the distribution is applied against and reduces the
adjusted basis of the shareholders for their stock, and, to the extent
that the distribution exceeds the shareholders' basis, the excess is
taxed "in the same manner as a gain from the sale or exchange of
property. '25 The corporation does not realize gain upon distribu-
tion of appreciated property to its shareholders.2 6 Therefore, this
variation can result in the same tax consequences that follow a distri-
bution in liquidation, but the corporation remains in existence. That
is, the shareholders acquire the property produced at a stepped-up
basis, although they are taxed on their gain as capital gain only, not
as ordinary income.
Thus, prior to the recent amendment to Section 117, a corporation
2U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, 29.22(a)-2o. But see note ig supra.
23Int. Rev. Code § s 3(a); Marcus Schlitt, P-H 1948 TC Mem. Dec. Serv. Para.
48,1o8 (1948). And see 3 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) §
21.16.
-'Int. Rev. Code § 117(a)(i)(A). This result would probably not be reached in
the absence of a series of such sales.
nInt. Rev. Code § 115(d).
"Although the Treasury has argued that it does. For a thorough discussion
of this matter see Molloy, Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in Kind
(195o) 6 Tax L. Rev. 57, 59. See also General Utilities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S.
2oo, 56 S. Ct. 185, 8o L. ed. 154 (1935).
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may have been used to produce property, and then: (i) it may have
been collapsed before realization of any gain by the corporation, or
(2) the property produced may have been distributed in kind to the
shareholders in the same circumstances, or (3) the stock may have been
sold prior to the distribution of any dividends, with the result in each
instance that the corporation may not have been taxed at all and the
shareholders may have been taxed only on long-term capital gain.
Success of the Collapsible under Prior Law
The progenitors of the collapsible device must have had many bad
moments. For one thing, the whole scheme rested upon the legal fiction
of the corporate entity, a notoriously perilous perch, at least since
the Gregory case.2 7 Furthermore, success of the device depended in
large part upon a rather literal reading of the Code in favor of the
taxpayer. In this respect we have come a long way since the Gould
case.
28
Nevertheless, the efficacy of the device under prior law is still a
live question. On February 7, 1950, Thomas J. Lynch, General Coun-
sel of the Treasury Department, toldthe Ways and Means Committee
there were over one hundred cases being examined by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue which involved the collapsible corporation. 29 The
new statutory provision concerning collapsibles does not affect those
cases. It is applicable only to taxable years ending after December 31,
1949, and applies only to gain realized after that date.30 Moreover, it
is expressly provided that the tax treatment of gains from so-called
collapsible corporations realized prior to January 1, 195o, shall be
made as if the new law had not been enacted, without inferences drawn
from the fact that the new subsection is not made applicable to gains
2"7In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. ed. 596 (1935), the
Supreme Court disregarded as a mere sham a corporation formed and utilized solely
in an effort to achieve tax advantages supposedly available under the statutory pro-
visions concerning corporate reorganizations.
2In Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53, 53, 62 L. ed. 211, 213 (1917),
the Court said it was the established rule that statutes "are construed most strongly
against the Government, and in favor of the citizen." More recently, however, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "It is the function and duty of courts to re-
solve doubts. We know of no reason why that function should be abdicated in a
tax case more than in any other...." White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292, 59
S. Ct. 179, 184, 83 L. ed. 172, 179 (1938). But see Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F. (2d)
739, 741 (C.A. 5th, 1949): "The tax statute in question should be strictly construed
in favor of the taxpayer ... "
8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o), 138.
"Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 195o,
80Pub. L. No. 814, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess., § 212(b) (195o).
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realized prior to such date and also without inferences drawn from
the limitations contained in the new law.8 '
There are a number of provisions in the tax laws which, reduced to
the jargon of a no-longer-popular song, say to the taxpayer: "It ain't
what you do; it's the way that you do it." Sections 115 and 117 are of
this type. In effect they say to the builder: "If you do it our way
through the use of a corporation, you can make money at capital gains
rates." Years ago the courts might not have recognized any Congress-
ional finger-crossing in this situation. In 1873 Justice Hunt viewed a
similar matter as follows:
32
"The Stamp Act of 1862 imposed a duty of two cents upon a
bank check, when drawn for an amount not less than twenty
dollars. A careful individual, having the amount of twenty dol-
lars to pay, pays the same by handing to his creditor two checks
of ten dollars each. He thus draws checks in payment of his debt
to the amount of twenty dollars, and yet pays no stamp duty ....
He has the legal right to split up his evidences of payment, and
thus to avoid the tax."
Years later, the Supreme Court still did not doubt the legal right
of the taxpayer ". . . to decrease the amount of what would otherwise
be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law per-
mits."33 But at the same time the Court refused to "exalt artifice above
reality" 34 or to recognize a form which in fact lacked substance. More
recently the Court has expanded the sham principle recognized in the
Gregory case35 and has undertaken to say, in the name of fairness, who
ought to be taxed on what, and when, almost in spite of specific sta-
tutory provisions.36 The cases are interesting and when carefully re-
viewed offer something of a feel for the way in which the pre-amend-
ment collapsible may be treated.
In an article dealing in part with the Hollywood version of the
collapsible, 37 Messrs. Bittker and Redlich have explored the cases and
have suggested a number of ways in which the collapsible was vulner-
"Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 212(b) (1950).
'United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506, 21 L. ed. 728, 729 (U.S. 1873).
"Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 469, 55 S. Ct. 266, 267, 79 L. ed. 596, 599
(1935).
"Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 470, 55 S. Ct. 266, 268, 79 L. ed. 596, 599
(1935).
'1Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. ed. 596 (1935).
"See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 69 S. Ct. 1210, 93 L. ed.
1659 (1949); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 737, 67 S. Ct. 1489, 91 L. ed. 1782
(1947); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 6o S. Ct. 554, 84 L. ed. 788 (1940).
"Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidation and the Income Tax (1950) 5
Tax L. Rev. 437.
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able even in the absence of specific legislation. For the most part, their
comments apply as well to the use of the device in the building in-
dustry as in the motion picture industry. They conclude that measured,
as it must be, by "such roguish concepts as equity and justice," 38 the
collapsible may be found wanting, conceding, however, that the "area
is one of shifting sands, with hazy boundary lines."
39
There may have been brave men since Agamemnon, but it is doubt-
ful any will come forward to take a stronger position concerning the
efficacy of the pre-amendment collapsible unless it be under the com-
pulsion of advocacy or the obligation of the judicial robe. President
Truman did not do so; in his January 23, 195o, message to Congress
he merely said that the shoreholders of collapsibles "might escape as
much as two-thirds of the tax they should pay."
40
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, testifying before the House Ways
and Means Committee, made reference to the fact that shareholders
of collapsible corporations ". . have attempted to convert ordinary
business and earned income into long-term capital gain." 41 Before
the same committee, General Counsel of the Treasury Lynch said
"... it is by no means clear that taxpayers using this [collapsible] de-
vice will be able to accomplish their tax saving objective, for the cor-
porate form in many of these cases may be held to be a sham."
42
Having suggested the nature of the collapsible device, and having
recognized its uncertain pre-amendment status as deftly explained by
Messrs. Bittker and Redlich,43 it is the purpose of this article to con-
sider in some detail the statutory answer to this recent tax-saving
effort.
The 595o Amendment
As citizens we all have a right, perhaps a duty, to complain of and
combat waste and extravagance in government. We also have a right
to pay our tax bills in the same fashion as we pay the bills of the
butcher, the baker and the candle-stick maker, the amount properly
SBittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax (1950) 5 Tax
L. Rev. 437 at 448.
'Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax (195o) 5 Tax
L. Rev. 437, 447.
"0Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of
195o, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 5. Emphasis added.
"Hearing before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 195o,
8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 2o. Emphasis added.
"Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means Revision of 1950, 8ist Cong.
2d. Sess. (195o) 138. Emphasis added.
"Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax (1950) 5
Tax L. Rev. 437.
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due and no more. Beyond this, however, we do well to remember that
in present times legitimate costs of government are high and that when
we help to defray these costs by way of tax payments we are paying
for an organized society without which many of our pleasures and
privileges could not exist.
44
However, the existence of loopholes in the tax law through which
persons in special circumstances can escape their fair share of the tax
burden is destructive of the equanimity with which most Americans
otherwise are willing and able to view the federal exactions. Congress
is sensitive to this and quick to close the loopholes as they are brought
to light.45 Particularly in times such as these, when tax rates are high,
a popular feeling of substantial fairness and uniformity in the im-
position of taxes is essential to the relatively smooth operation of the
federal taxing program. Without any thought of moral indignation 46
concerning those who may47 have benefited from the collapsible de-
vice, and, indeed, perhaps with a kind of wish-I'd-thought-of-that feel-
ing, we may well applaud the Congressional effort to eliminate this
recently discovered possible pathway to tax inequality.
In the Code amendments made by the Revenue Act of 1950, 48
Congress has attempted to put an end to the tax advantages which
may have flowed from the use of the collapsible corporation. Under
Section 117, as amended,49 gain realized upon the sale or exchange,
whether in liquidation or otherwise, of stock in a collapsible corpora-
"See Griswold, The Blessings of Taxation: Recent Trends in the Law of Fed-
eral Taxation (195o) 36 A. B. A. J. 999.
'5See, e.g., Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U. S. 619, 70 S. Ct. 905, 94 L. ed. 862
(1950), and Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 217 (1950), noted (1951) 4 Fla. L.
Rev. xx8. A loophole involving the deduction for amortizable bond premium, Int.
Rev. Code § 125, was recognized by the Supreme Court and closed by Congress in
the same year.
"But see Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 45: "A legitimate cor-
poration ... would ordinarily pay the corporate income tax on its net income and
its shareholders would pay ordinary income tax on their dividends from the cor-
poration." Emphasis added.
't And it still is "may," as suggested supra page 15o.
"Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 212 (1950).
"For convenient reference, new Int. Rev. Code § 117(m) is set forth here in full:
"(in) Collapsible Corporation.-
"(i) Treatment of gain to shareholders.-Gain from the sale or exchange
(whether in liquidation or otherwise) of stock of a collapsible corporation, to the
extent that it would be considered (but for the provisions of this subsection) as gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, shall, except
as provided in paragraph (3), be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of
property which is not a capital asset.
"(2) Definitions.-
(A) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'collapsible corporation' means
a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction,
1951]
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tion will, subject to certain limitations, be treated as ordinary income.
At the outset it should be observed that under Section 117(m) gain
will be treated as ordinary income only if it would, except for that sec-
tion, be long-term capital gain. If the stock in a collapsible is not held
more than six months, gain on its disposition retains its character as
short-term capital gain. Although such capital gain is taken into ac-
count in full50 in determining net income and does not qualify for the
25 percent tax limitation applicable to long-term capital gain, neverthe-
less it is capital gain against which capital losses may be deducted. 51
Therefore, one with a substantial capital loss carry-over, 52 or already
or production of property, or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed
or availed of, with a view to-
(i) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation or
otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, prior to the realization by the
corporation manufacturing, constructing, or producing the property of a substan-
tial part of the net income to be derived from such property, and
(ii) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property.
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), a corporation shall be deemed to
have manufactured, constructed, or produced property, if-
(i) it engaged in the manufacture, construction, or production of such property
to any extent,
(ii) it holds property having a basis determined, in whole or in part, by
reference to the cost of such property in the hands of a person who manufactured,
constructed, or produced the property, or
(iii) it holds property having a basis determined, in whole or in part, by reference
to the cost of property manufactured, constructed, or produced by the corporation.
"(3) Limitations on application of subsection.-In the case of gain realized by
a shareholder upon his stock in a collapsible corporation-
(A) This subsection shall not apply unless, at any time after the commencement
of the manufacture, construction, or production of the property, such shareholder
(i) owned (or was considered as owning) more than io percentum in value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation, or (ii) owned stock which was considered as
owned at such time by another shareholder who then owned (or was considered as
owning) more than lo percentum in value of the outstanding stock of the corpora-
tion; ,
(B) this subsection shall not apply to the gain recognized during a taxable year
unless more than 70 percentum of such gain is attributable to the property so manu-
factured, constructed, or produced; and
(C) this subsection shall not apply to gain realized after the expiration of three
years following the completion of such manufacture, construction, or production.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the ownership of stock shall be determined
in accordance with the rules prescribed by paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) of
section 503 (a), except that, in addition to the persons prescribed by paragraph (2)
of that section, the family of an individual shall include the spouses of that indi-
vidual's brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood) and the spouses
of that individual's lineal descendants."
'Int. Rev. Code § 117(b).
nInt. Rev. Code § 17(d) limits the deduction for losses from sales or exchanges
of capital assets, in the case of individuals, to the amount of gains from such sales
and exchanges, plus the taxpayer's net income or $,ooo whichever is less.
52See Int. Rev. Code § 117(e).
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aware of substantial capital losses during a taxable year, may still
profitably resort to the collapsible device if he can realize the hoped-for
capital gain within the six months period.
It is equally important to observe that Section 117(m) does not
alter the character of losses from the sale or exchange of stock in a
collapsible corporation. Such losses remain capital losses subject to the
statutory limitations on allowance.53
As suggested previously in this article, the objective in resorting to
the collapsible device was the realization as long-term capital gain of
what would, except for the device, constitute ordinary income. Before
undertaking a discussion of the detailed provisions of Section 117(m),
it is appropriate to suggest that the new subsection thwarts this ob-
jective regardless of which of the three variations of the device de-
scribed above is used. For this purpose it is assumed the corporation
involved is a collapsible and that none of the statutory limitations
on the application of the new section is applicable. First of all, if the
corporation is dissolved prior to realization of gain by the corporation,
amounts distributed in complete liquidation are to be treated under
Section 115(c) as in full payment in exchange for stock. If the stock
has been held for more than six months and there is a gain, this would
normally be long-term capital gain, and it is converted to ordinary in-
come by Section 117(m).54
Secondly, if the stock in the corporation is sold and there is a gain,
this again would normally be long-term capital gain,55 and again the
new subsection converts it to ordinary income.
r See Int. Rev. Code § 117(d).
'4Sometimes the value of property distributed in liquidation of a corporation is
not ascertainable at the time of distribution. This was the case in Commissioner v.
Carter, 17o F. (2d) gi (C.A. 2d, 1948), in which upon liquidation 32 oil brokerage
contracts, and certain other assets, were distributed to the corporation's sole share-
holder who had owned the stock for more than ten years. No additional services
were to be performed by the corporation under the contracts, but payments under
the contracts were dependent upon future contingencies which made valuation of the
contracts impossible at the time of distribution. When payments under the contracts
were subsequently received by the shareholder, all of which payments together with
prior distributions exceeded the shareholder's basis for the stock given up upon
liquidation, the Second Circuit held such payments constituted capital gain, just as
if the contracts had been valued upon distribution at a figure equal to the payments
finally received. Inasmuch as this result rests on the requirement of Section 115(c)
that amounts distributed in liquidation be treated as in full payment in exchange for
stock, it appears that under Section 117(m) , if the corporation involved in the
Carter case were deemed to be a collapsible, gain there properly treated as capital
gain would now be converted to ordinary income.
'Again assuming the stock is not held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business. int Rev. Code § 11T(a)(i)(A). Of course, if the stock is treated as
so held, the gain on the exchange is ordinary income regardless of Sec. 117(m).
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Finally, if corporate assets are distributed to shareholders at a time
when the corporation has no earnings or profits, so that the distribu-
tion cannot be treated as a dividend and taxable for that reason as
ordinary income, and if there is a gain on such distribution, the new
subsection again converts the gain to ordinary income. The conclu-
sion as regards this variation is not quite so clear from a reading of the
statute alone. Section 117(m) is concerned only with "gain from the
sale or exchange of stock." As observed previously in this article, Sec-
tion 115(c) provides that distribution in liquidation "shall be treated
as in full payment in exchange for the stock," so that in the case of
liquidation distributions the resulting gain is gain from an exchange
for tax purposes and therefore within Section 117(m). However, Sec-
tion 115 (d), which applies to non-dividend distributions other than
upon liquidation, requires instead that the excess of the distribu-
tion over the cost bases of the stock ".... shall be taxable in the same
manner as a gain from the sale or exchange of property." This may
seem to leave room for making a technical argument that the third
variation on the collapsible device is not covered by the new subsec-
tion.56 The parenthetical clause in the new provision 57 and its legis-
lative history, 58 suggests that the courts will give such an argument
short shrift, if anyone is bold enough to advance it.
Congress had several possible approaches to the collapsible prob-
lem. It might have attacked the device by a brief and very general pro-
vision similar in nature to Section 45. That section, aimed at a more
ancient income-distorting device, gives the Commissioner broad au-
thority to allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances
among commonly owned businesses if he determines such allocation is
necessary to prevent tax evasion or clearly to reflect the income of such
5'The technical argument is: Section 117(m) applies only to "gain from the sale
or exchange ... of stock." Section 115 (d) does not say that gain from a l15(d) dis-
tribution shall be treated as gain from a sale or exchange, but only that it shall be
taxed as if it were such gain. If the gain is not in fact from a sale or exchange and
is not required to be treated as if it were, Section 117(m) is inapplicable.
'"(whether in liquidation or otherwise)."
5'See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 89: "In like manner,
the corporation might distribute the property in question without liquidating and,
under Section 15(d), the value of the property distributed, to the extent that it was
not a dividend, would first be applied against the adjusted basis of the stock to the
shareholders and the excess, if any, would be taxable in the same manner as a gain
from the sale or exchange or property." While this statement skirts the technical
argument, supra note 36, the context in which it appears makes it evident that the
Finance Committee felt the new provision covered this possibility.
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businesses. Apparently the Commissioner desired a more specific guide
for his attack on collapsibles. 59
On the other hand, Congress could have undertaken permanently
to collapse the collapsible by a destructive statutory provision spelled
out in fine detail. This means has been used, for example, to prevent
the allowance of deductions for artificial losses by enumerating pre-
cise circumstances in which losses from sales or exchanges will not be
allowed.6 0 But it would require tremendous imagination and ingenuity
to deal effectively with the collapsible in any such precise fashion.
In any event, the final legislative product is between the two ex-
tremes suggested. It combines a full measure of discretion in the Com-
missioner with difficult fact determinations and some amazingly pre-
cise rules of thumb in a manner more reminiscent of Section 129,61 an-
other loophole plugging provision. An analysis of the specific provis-
ions of the new subsection follows.
Use of the phrase "collapsible corporation" requires a definition.
Under Section 117(m)(2) a corporation is a collapsible only if, among
other things, it is ".... formed or availed of 62 principally for the manu-
facture, construction, or production of property...."63 Obviously,
as far as this part of the definition is concerned, it makes no difference
whether the corporation was created for or merely utilized for the
condemned purpose.
The use of the word "property" in a subsection of Section 117,
which deals with gains and losses from the sale or exchange of prop-
erty, does not seem surprising. And yet any casual explanation for the
use of the word based on this coincidence is apt to be fallacious. The
wrhomas J. Lynch, General Counsel of the Treasury department, testifying
before the Ways and Means Committee, replied to a question on the nature of
remedial legislation sought as follows: "We would not like to ask for great dis-
cretion. On the other hand, we would like to be assured that the legislation does
not place in jeopardy the normal liquidation of corporations, corporations which
are organized and carried on regularly to conduct a business." Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of ig5o, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess.
(1950) 140.
cOSee Int. Rev. Code § 24(b).
OInt. Rev. Code § 129 deals with acquisitions which have as their principal
purpose the evasion or avoidance of federal taxes, but the Commissioner's authority
to deal with such cases is sharply limited by specific rules laid down in the section.
See, generally, Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section
129 of the Internal Revenue Code (1944) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 196.
"-For similar language in a long-standing Internal Revenue Code provision see
Sec. 1o2.
13Or principally for the holding of stock in a collapsible. Int. Rev. Code §
117(m)(2)(A).
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property produced by a collapsible is not a capital asset in the hands
of the corporation originally or, later, in the hands of the shareholders.
The stock in the corporation is a capital asset, and it was this fact,
not the character of the property produced, which made possible
utilization of the device. However, the existence of property, which in-
creased in value without the realization of income either by the cor-
poration or its shareholders, was an essential element in the tax-sav-
ing scheme. Increase in the value of the stock resulting from such in-
crease in the value of the corporation property was what made avail-
able the beneficial provisions of Section 117.64
It is true, of course, that an increase in the value of stock might
result from appreciation in the value of property owned but in no
sense produced by the corporation. However, if such property is in-
vestment property, it qualifies as a capital asset and it would be un-
necessary to resort to the collapsible device in an effort to have gain
from its sale or exchange come within the capital gains provisions.
Similarly, property used in a trade or business qualifies for capital
gains treatment under Section 117(0). Thus the new subsection is
pointed at property produced for sale in the usual course of business.
Bearing in mind that there is no direct relationship between the
word "property" as used in Sections 117(a) and 117(m), it still seems
reasonable to suppose that anything which would be considered prop-
erty under the former may also be regarded as property under the
latter. For example, if a corporation entered into a valuable contract
and then distributed it to shareholders upon dissolution, the contract
would probably be regarded as property produced by the corporation. 63
Definitions concerning the production 6 of property are included
within the principal definition in Section 117(m). First of all, a cor-
poration is deemed to have produced property if it engaged in such
"See 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) § 21.16.
'5This example does not have reference to what appears to have been the usual
Hollywood procedure of producing a picture, contracting for its distribution, and
then distributing the contract to the shareholders. See, e.g., Hearings before Com-
mittee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 195o, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (95o)
70. In those cases the picture produced would constitute the property for the pur-
pose of Sec. 117(m), and the contract would simply provide for realization of the
gain from such picture. But compare Commissioner v. Carter, 17o F. (2d) 911 (C.A. 2d,
1948), involving the distribution of a brokerage contract to the corporation's sole
shareholder.
"The statutory language is, of course, "manufactured, constructed, or produced."
However, for the sake of simplicity the word produced alone, or one of its varia-
tions, is used in the text unless the content requires the use of one of the other two
words.
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production to any extent. Therefore, if Jones and Smith partially con-
struct houses and then transfer them to a corporation for completion,
by means of a taxable sale or exchange, upon completion the corpora-
tion has constructed the houses for the purposes of Section 117(m).
Secondly, a corporation which has, in fact had nothing to do with
construction will be deemed to have constructed property if it holds
such property with a substitute basis determined by reference to the
basis of the person who constructed the property. For example, if Jones
and Smith completed the construction of houses and then transferred
them to Construction Corporation in a Section z12(b)( 5 ) tax-free ex-
change, the corporation would be deemed to have constructed the
houses.
67
Finally, if the corporation holds property which has a basis deter-
mined by reference to other property which it has produced, the prop-
erty held is deemed to have been produced by the corporation. Thus,
in the case of a tax-free exchange under Section l12(b)(1) of property
for property of like kind, the property acquired in the exchange will be
deemed to have been produced by the corporation if the corporation
produced the property given up in the exchange. 68
But, obviously, not every corporation which is formed or availed of
principally for the production of property is a collapsible corporation.
If the new subsection is to apply, such action must have been taken
with a view to the sale or exchange of stock by the shareholders or a
distribution to them prior to the corporation's realization of a sub-
stantial part of the net income to be derived from the property and
with a view to realization by the shareholders of the gain attributable
to the property.
In Section 117 (m) (2) (A) (i) and (ii) the phrases "the proper-
ty" and "such property" are used, referring back to the first part of the
MInt. Rev. Code § i12(b)(5) provides against the recognition of gain or loss, in
certain circumstances, upon the transfer of property to a corporation in exchange
for stock in the corporation. In such a case, under Sec. ii3(a)(8), the basis for the
stock received is the same as the shareholder's basis for the property which he trans-
ferred to the corporation. So it would appear that if the collapsible device did not
occur to the hypothetical builders, Jones and Smith, until after they had com-
pleted construction of the houses, they could run the property through a Sec.
ii2(b)(5) incorporation and then collapse it with the same consequences as if they
had undertaken the venture originally by means of a collapsible corporation. The
recent amendment squarely prevents this avoidance possibility as regards future
transactions. It is just as clear that Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266,
79 L. ed. 596 (1935), prevented successful utilization of this device in the past.
n This is so because, under Int. Rev. Code § 113(a)(6), a Sec. 112(b)(1) exchange
results in a basis for the acquired property determined by reference to the cost of
the property given up in the exchange.
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definition of a collapsible, concerning property for the production of
which the corporation was principally formed or utilized. In other
words, a corporation is a collapsible only if formed or availed of prin-
cipally for the production of property with a view to sale or exchange
of stock by the shareholders or distribution to them prior to the realiza-
tion by the corporation of a substantial part of the gain attributable to
the property for the production of which the corporation was princi-
pally formed or utilized and with a view to realization by the share-
holders of the gain attributable to such property. The Senate Finance
Committee Report on H.R. 892069 appropriately explains that under
this language the shareholders of an ordinary corporation, which has
produced and disposed of property in the usual manner, will not be
caught by Section 117(m) upon dissolution, or in other circumstances,
merely because the corporation has produced property from which it
has not derived a substantial portion of the available net income. It
would not be held to have been formed or utilized principally for the
production of such property. In general, the effect of Section 117 (m) -
(2) (i) and (ii) is to narrow the scope of the new subsection down to
the more or less artificial, one-shot collapsible such as is suggested
earlier in this article70 in the example explaining the nature of the
device. It could hardly be applied to a long-established concern, al-
though there is the possibility that such a concern might be used prin-
cipally for a particular project and, so availed of, might fall within the
new subsection.
If some ordinary corporations which have a long, continued exist-
ence escape difficulties under Section 117(m), as they clearly do, it is not
so clear that all will fare as well. Speaking before the Senate Finance
Committee on behalf of the United States Chamber of Commerce,
Ellsworth C. Alvord called attention to this problem in the following
words: 7 '
"Much worse is the extreme breadth of application of the sec-
tion, extending to many areas of legitimate enterprise.... The
Bureau might... seek to apply the provision to legitimate bus-
iness promoters who initiate a business venture and, after its
successful establishment, dispose of their stock in a bona fide sale
"Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 89.
7 Supra page 148.
"Statement by Ellsworth C. Alvord, Chairman, Committee on Federal Finance,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, contained in Hearings before Com-
mittee on Finance on H. R. 8920, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 839; see also Statement
of the American Mining Congress, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means
on Revenue Revision of 195o, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 730.
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to buyers who expect to continue the business indefinitely. True,
Section 211 [enacted as Section 212] according to Treasury state-
ments and the Ways and Means Committee report, is not in-
tended to apply to these situations. Perhaps the bureau would
not seek to apply it in an improper fashion. Nevertheless, it is
bad law-making to declare everybody a criminal on the assump-
tion that the police will arrest only wrong doers."
In this regard, the new subsection depends very heavily on fair and
enlightened administration. The severe uncertainty facing the tax-
payer in this circumstance suggests that the Commissioner should be
required to issue rulings concerning the tax consequences of such sales
of stock.72
The use of words such as "principally for" and "with a view to,"
which are suggestive of subjective intent, is not new in the tax law.73
There is some possibility these words may be interpreted as merely
raising questions concerning objective results. 74 The Commissioner
may take the position that the liquidation of a corporation under such
circumstances as would result in the conversion of substantial ordinary
income to capital gain is in itself sufficient indication of the proscribed
purpose and views, if the more objective features of the Section 1 17(m)
tests are met.
Perhaps it would have been better to inject no subjective element
into the new provision.75 Tax provisions involving difficult factual de-
terminations, particularly those resting on motive or purpose, do not
promote the kind of certainty that business men reasonably like to
find in the law.
Limitations on Application of Section I17(m)
Even if a corporation is within the statutory definition of the phrase
"collapsible corporation," a sale or exchange of its stock or a distribu-
tion by it may not subject a shareholder to the rigors of the new pro-
"Cf. Mim. 4963, 1939-2 C. B. 459.
"See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code § 129, "the principal purpose for which;" § 8l(c)(s)(a)
"in contemplation of his death;" § 8ii(c)(i)(C), "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment." Emphasis added.
711n Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 7o6, 69 S. Ct. 301, 303, 93
L. ed. 33o, 337 (1949), Justice Black successfully extracted the subjective element
from the estate tax provision concerning transfers "intended to take effect.., at or
after... death," int. Rev. Code § 8i1(c), saying: "...a post-death attempt to probe
the settlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the effective-
ness of the 'possession or enjoyment' provision as an instrument to frustrate estate
tax evasion."
"But it is difficult to see how non-avoiding entrepreneurs could be protected,
even to the extent they are under the new section, by means of an objective, let-the-
chips-fall-where-they-may provision.
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vision. Section 117(m) is made inapplicable if any of the following three
conditions is met:
76
1. If the shareholder owns, or is considered as owning, no
more than lo% in value of the stock at any time after com-
mencement of production of the property, or
2. If not more than 70% of the gain recognized during the
taxable year upon the sale, exchange or distribution is attribut-
able to the property, or
3. If the gain is realized more than three years after comple-
tion of the property.
The report of the Ways and Means Committee explains the objec-
tive of the first limitation as follows: 77
"It is the purpose of the first limitation to insure that the pro-
vision will only be applicable to a shareholder who by virtue
of his stock ownership can be presumed to be an interested party
to the project whether at the time of its organization or at some
intermediate date."
It is difficult to see how this purpose is effectively carried out by the
limiting provision. It is not improbable that a minority shareholder
may be a very interested person in the transaction, and may be influen-
tial in promoting the scheme. This is particularly likely since the pas-
sage of the new law because a minority shareholder owning no more
than io percent of the stock will escape the pinch of sectioni 17(m).
On the other hand, the new provision will, for example, hit a minority
shareholder who owns 12 percent in value of the outstanding shares
and who is forced by a decision of the majority to participate in a
proscribed distribution.
Interesting in the light of statements before the Ways and Means
Committee78 is the possibility that under the new provision ten per-
sons may form an invulnerable collapsible corporation. If they divide
the shares so that no one person's equals in value more than lo percent
of the outstanding stock, each shareholder may escape the effects of the
new provision and realize capital gain in lieu of ordinary income.
This arrangement, which the Bureau might have attacked successfully
prior to the recent amendment,79 now appears impregnable in the
"zThe summary expression in the text of the three principal limitations is in
general terms and is therefore inaccurate in detail. See Int. Rev. Code § 117(m)(3),
supra note 49.
'House Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 98.
"'See note 13 supra.
nSee discussion in text supra page 15o.
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light of the very specific terms of Section 1 17 (m) (3) (A) .80 But if the
collapsible device was vulnerable absent Section 117(m), an arrange-
ment such as this may continue to be vulnerable, because the limitation
simply places it outside the scope of the new provision.
For the purposes of the stock ownership limitation, ownership rules
applicable to personal holding companies under Section 503 (a) (i),
(2), (3), (5) and (6) control. In addition, however, the family of an
individual is defined to include the spouses of the individual's lineal
decendants. These rules of stock ownership ". . . prevent any one share-
holder's disguising his interest by the placement of stock of the corpo-
ration among the different members of his family."8 '
The second limitation is intended to insure that the new provision
will apply only in instances in which there is a substantial relationship
between the gain realized by the shareholder and the property produced
by the corporation.8 2 If the gain is substantially attributable to other
transactions on which the corporation has been taxed, the section is ap-
propriately made inapplicable. Accordingly, the new provision does not
apply unless more than 70 percent of the gain recognized by a share-
holder during the taxable year is attributable to the property produced
by the corporation with a view to distribution or some other transaction
under which the shareholders, but not the corporation, would realize
the gain attributable to such property.
The 70 percent limitation should be read in connection with the
question of whether the corporation was formed or utilized "princi-
pally for" the production of property and with the proscribed view.
Even so, the actual effect of the second limitation is difficult to ascertain
and will depend greatly on the way in which the new provision is ad-
ministered. Two possibilities, based on the example of a collapsible
previously set out in this article,8 3 will suggest the uncertainty. Suppose
that for the proscribed purpose and with the proscribed view Jones and
Smith establish Construction Corporation, which then carries out the
building project. Upon completion of the houses, Jones and Smith be-
come aware of Section 117(m). At this point they cause the corporation
to sell 3o percent of the houses, and then dissolve the corporation and
distribute the proceeds of the sale and the unsold houses. The corpora-
8See, e.g., Statement by Ellsworth C. Alvord, contained in Hearings before
Committee on Finance on H. R. 8920, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950). "The inevitable
consequence is that schemers can tailor their plans so as to avoid the application of
this provision."
8'House Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 98.
2House Rep. No. 2319, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 98.
8Supra page 148.
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tion is a collapsible and the gain of the shareholders will be taxed as
ordinary income, because the corporation constructed the property; and
it was formed for that purpose; and the property was produced with a
view to distribution and to realization of the gain attributable to it by
the shareholders. Futhermore, the second limitation is not applicable,
because the shareholders' gain is all attributable to the property pro-
duced, even though part of the gain has been taxed to the corporation.
This result seems desireable; otherwise the effect of the section would
merely be to make collapsibles 30 percent less efficient taxwise.
However, take a more extreme case. Suppose, upon the same facts as
those in the example just stated, that when Jones and Smith become
aware of Section 117(m) they cause the corporation itself to sell all the
houses.8 4 If the corporation were then dissolved, again all the gain of
Jones and Smith would be attributable to the property, and te second
limitation still would not apply.8 5 It hardly seems likely Congress in-
tended the new provision to cover such a case, and perhaps the new pro-
vision should not be so interpreted. And yet, it is difficult to see how
regulations under the new section can solve this dilemma; how can the
first possibility suggested be explained to remain within the section, as
it should, while the second possibility is removed, as it clearly should
be? Such a matter should not be left to ad hoc determinations by the
commissioner.
This seems to be the difficulty. Congress may have intended the part
of the definition dealing with realization by the corporation of a sub-
stantial part of the income to be derived from the property to make the
actual operation of the corporation in part determinative of whether a
corporation is a collapsible. But the statute does not say so. The entire
definition makes the collapsible status dependent upon the purpose
and views of those forming or using the corporation. If the corporation
were formed or used for the condemned purpose and with the pro-
scribed view, it would seem not to escape the collapsible definition by
subsequent action, although upon dissolution one of the limitations
written into the new provision might relieve its shareholders of the
rigors of Section 117(m).
"'This might be preferable to a straight 117(m) liquidation under which Jones
and Smith were taxed at ordinary income rates, if the effect was for them to be
taxed at capital gains rates on subsequent liquidation. That is, the corporate tax
plus their capital gains tax might equal less than their tax on the entire gain
treated as ordinary income.
"Note that the corporation is within the definition of a collapsible, because
it was formed and, for a time, utilized with the proscribed purpose and view. The
second limitation does not take into account a change of purpose or view.
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The third limitation establishes an arbitrary time limit of three years
beyond which gain realized will not be affected by the new provision.
That is, if the shareholders do not realize their gain until after three
years following the completion of the production of the property, then
the corporation will not be treated as a collapsible corporation.8 6 The
reasoning behind this limitation appears to be that it would generally
be undesirable for the corporation to hold the completed property in
disuse for a period of three years, and, therefore, if it is held that long a
substantial part of the gain attributable to the property will probably
have been realized by and taxed to the corporation. In so far as the new
provision is aimed at the motion picture and building industries, this
reasoning seems sound, but the limitation may need clarification by way
of the regulations as regards other types of businesses.
There is at last one industry which must store its product for a long
period of time, often exceeding three years. Whiskey, of course, must be
aged. For this reason it may appear that the new provision has in effect
confirmed the efficacy of the collapsible device in the distilling industry.
The use of the collapsible prior to the passage of the new law may have
been vulnerable on corporate sham principles. Seemingly now there is
need for administrative interpretation of the word "completion" as
used in the third limitation, so as to indicate there is not now a certain
loophole where there was only a dubious one before.
One interesting consequence of the three-year limitation should be
mentioned. To go back again to the example at the beginning of this
article,8 7 if Jones and Smith set up Construction Corporation to con-
struct houses but have the corporation rent such houses for three years,
any gain to Jones and Smith upon liquidation or distribution or upon
the sale of their stock will get the benefits of the capital gains pro-
visions. Probably the way to look at this is that, under the new pro-
vision, property initially held primarily for sale to customers loses its
characteristics as such if held for more than three years. Thus, gain at-
tributable to such property should be treated as analogous to gain from
a Section 1170) sale or exchangess In any event, it may be greatly to
the advantage of the speculative corporate builder to be in part a land-
lord. Whether market risks and working capital difficulties render this
impracticable for business reasons will depend upon the facts in a
"See House Rep. No. 2319, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 99.
"Supra page 148.
"In certain circumstances, under Int. Rev. Code § 117(J), gain from the sale or
exchange of property used in a trade or business qualifies for capital gains treatment,
even though the property is outside the definition of capital assets.
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particular case. But, apart from such other considerations, there seem
to be substantial tax advantages.
Collapse under Section ix2(b)(7)
There remains to be considered the relationship between newly re-
vived Section 112(b)(7)89 and new Section 117 (In). It has been sug-
gested9 ° that for the year 1951 Section 1 2(b)(7) makes possible suc-
cessful use of the collapsible device by way of a partially tax-free liqui-
dation under that section. Such a suggestion seems to evidence a mis-
understanding either of Section i 12(b)(7), of Section 117 (m) or of the
collapsible problem generally.
Under Section 112(b)(7) an individual shareholder of a corporation
which is liquidated within one calendar month in 1951, in conformance
with other specific requirements of the section, may elect to be taxed
specially on his gain on the liquidating distributions. His gain, of
course, is the difference between the adjusted basis of his stock and the
value of what he receives. Upon election, he is taxed as follows:
i. To the extent that his gain does not exceed his ratable
share of the corporate earnings and profits, it is taxed as a
dividend;
2. To the extent that his gain exceed his share of corporate
earnings and profits but does not exceed the value of money or
or of stock or securities acquired by the corporation after August
15, 195o, and received by the shareholder, it is taxed as long-term
or short-term capital gain, depending upon how long he has
held his stock; and
3. To the extent that his gain is not taxed under (i) or (2)
above, it is not recognized.
The important point here, as far as the collapsible device is con-
cerned, is the effect of a 112(b)(7) liquidation on the shareholder's basis
for the property acquired. This is governed by Section 113(a)(18),
which provides that the basis for the property acquired shall be ". .. the
same as the basis of such stock cancelled or redeemed in the liquida-
tion, decreased in the amount of any money received by... [the share-
holder], and increased in the amount of gain recognized to him." Thus
a Section 112(b)(7) liquidation would fail to result in the stepped-up
basis for the property acquired upon liquidation which is an essential
cog in the collapsible device,91 except where the sale-of-stock variation
"'Pub. L. No. 814, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess., § 206 (1950).
9®See, e.g., Landman, Tax Highlights of 1950 (1951) 29 Taxes 39, 42.
OAdmittedly, the suggestion made here presupposes that the property distributed
would not qualify as a capital asset in the hands of the shareholder. If it did so
qualify, the shareholder would secure the benefits of the capital gains provisions,
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is used. Section 112(b)(7) has no bearing, of course, on the latter varia-
tion.
Except for flaws and uncertainties in the definition of capital as-
sets, 92 the non-recognition provisions of the Code could hardly pro-
mote the collapsible device, 93 because the success of the plan depends
upon recognition of gain, capital gain of course, so as to produce the
necessary stepped-up basis for the property acquired. To go back once
more to the example of a collapsible set out previously in this article, 94
Jones and Smith could resort to a Section ii2(b)(7) liquidation after
Construction Corporation had completed construction of the houses,
but if they did they would simply wind up owning the houses with a
tax basis equal to the cost of their stock, which is exactly what they
would seek to avoid by way of the collapsible.9 5
On the other hand, a consideration of the non-recognition pro-
visions in connection with collapsibles is not wholly unprofitable. These
provisions suggest a manner in which two variations of the collapsible
device could perhaps have been better attacked. The new provision
saps the life of the collapsible by providing ordinary income treatment
for what would otherwise be long-term capital gain. Much the same
thing could have been accomplished by providing for partial non-rec-
ognition96 of gain realized upon liquidating or other non-dividend
distributions of collapsibles. The foregoing comments on the relation-
ship between Sections 117 (m) and 112(b)(7) suggest how this would
thwart the device. That is, upon distribution the shareholders would
fail to get the stepped-up basis necessary to the success of the plan.
One advantage in non-recognition treatment of the collapsible
device would be avoidance of imposition of the tax at an inappro-
and the only effect of Sec. 12(b)(7) would be to postpone his realization of capital
gain until he disposed of the property. In the simple example, supra note 19, used
throughout this article, the houses should be treated as held primarily for sale to
customers even in the hands of Jones and Smith after dissolution, and therefore
they would not be capital assets. But that result would not always follow. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Carter, 17o (2d) 911 (C. A. 2d., 1948).
2See note 91 supra.
OExcept for Int. Rev. Code § 117(m), the non-recognition provisions might be of
incidental use. See, e.g., note 67 supra.
"'Supra page 148.
!3This assumes, of course, that Int. Rev. Code § 112 (b)(7) in a sense overrides Sec.
117(m), which seems to be a proper assumption in that Sec. 117 deals with the
manner in which gain shall be taxed but Sec. 112 determines whether it shall be
recognized at all for tax purposes.
GIn this respect the suggested provision could closely parallel Int. Rev. Code
§ 1i2(b)(7). As suggested. supra note gi, this might necessitate further amendment
of the Code definition of capital assets. Int. Rev. Code § 117(a).
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priate time. A shareholder may be hard pressed for cash with which
to pay a tax imposed upon a distribution in kind. More important,
however, would be the avoidance of having to determine the value of
the property distributed. The tax would, of course, be imposed when
the property was disposed of, and if it were disposed of by sale there
would be no valuation problem at all.
Thus, in so far as the use of the collapsible device hinges on cor-
porate distributions, a mandatory Section i12(b)(7) might be a very
satisfactory solution to the problem. However, the sale-of-stock varia-
tion would remain to be dealt with.
If the sale of stock in a collapsible were allowed at capital gains
rates, even if the corporation retained its character as a collapsible af-
ter the sale, the new shareholder would have a new costs basis for his
shares and the property produced by the corporation could be distrib-
uted in such a manner that neither the corporation nor the sharehold-
ers ever would be taxed at ordinary income rates on the gain from
the property. Section 117(m) appropriately prevents this. If the non-
recognition approach to the other variations of the collapsible device
were adopted, the sale-of-stock variation could probably be taken care
of by excluding stock in a collapsible corporation from the definition
of capital assest. 97
It will be observed that this treatment of the sale of stock is not
subject to the objections aimed at similar treatment of gain from dis-
tributions. That is, the gain is taxed at an appropriate time from the
standpoint of ability to pay, and no valuation problem is presented.
The exchange of stock other than in cancellation or redemption would,
of course, raise the usual valuation problems, but the shareholder who
elected to make the exchange would not be heard to object to the time
of imposition of the tax.
Conclusion
With only minor reservations, new Section 117(m) effectively sounds
the death knell of the collapsible. Properly administered, it will not
give rise to harsh or inequitable results. That there may be more satis-
factory methods of dealing with the problem, either along the lines
suggested in this article or otherwise, is hardly to be doubted. It is
even more clear that the collapsible corporation has simply served to
spotlight one of the many small flaws in the capital gains provisions
of the Code. It will probably be a cold day down under before every-
one agrees that these provisions contain no imperfections.
"Although it might be considered desirable to treat loss as capital loss and
short-term gain as capital gain, as has, in effect, been done under Int. Rev. Code
§ 117(m).
